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TAKING THE NATION OUT OF 
ALIENATION: DANDAMUDI v. TISCH 
AFFIRMS THAT NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS 
ARE ENTITLED TO SUSPECT CLASS 
PROTECTION 
Abstract: On July 10, 2012, in Dandamudi v. Tisch, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit struck down New York Education Law sec-
tion 6805(1)(6), reasoning that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The law explicitly 
denied legal, nonimmigrant aliens the ability to apply for a license to 
practice as a pharmacist in New York. The Second Circuit’s decision di-
verged from those of other circuits that have held similar laws targeting 
nonimmigrant aliens to be constitutional. This Comment argues that the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Dandamudi faithfully comports with Supreme 
Court Equal Protection Clause precedent. Further, it asserts that the Dan-
damudi court’s ruling is a much-needed affirmation of nonimmigrant al-
iens’ right to work and contribute productively to American society. 
Introduction 
 Every year, the United States admits millions of aliens across its 
borders to visit, work, and live.1 For purposes of classification, these al-
iens are divided into two categories: immigrant aliens and nonimmi-
grant aliens.2 Immigrant aliens receive authorization to reside in the 
United States indefinitely as legal permanent residents (“LPRs”).3 
Nonimmigrant aliens may reside in the United States only temporarily 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Randall Monger, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2011, at 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_fr_2011.pdf; Randall Mon-
ger & James Yankay, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2011.pdf. An alien is “any person not a citizen 
or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). 
2 See Justin Storch, Legal Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed Professions, 
Modern Am., Spring 2011, at 12, 13. 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); Storch, supra note 2, at 13. According to the DHS, the 
United States authorized roughly one million people for LPR status in 2011. See Monger, 
supra note 1, at 2. 
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and for a specific purpose.4 Although all nonimmigrant aliens are lim-
ited to temporary visas, many nonimmigrants utilize extension provi-
sions to continue living in the United States for longer periods.5 
 Despite the United States’ national immigration policy that wel-
comes millions of LPR and nonimmigrant aliens each year, individual 
states frequently seek to restrict the activities of aliens living within their 
borders.6 State laws restricting aliens from receiving state benefits, 
working in certain professions, and even attaining an education exem-
plify state alienage legislation that stretches from the late nineteenth 
century to the present day.7 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the constitu-
tionality of state laws affecting aliens has changed drastically over time.8 
The bedrock of the Court’s modern jurisprudence, however, is the no-
                                                                                                                      
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Nonimmigrants include tourists, 
students, diplomats, workers, and professionals who come to the United States on tempo-
rary visas. Id. The DHS estimates that 159 million nonimmigrants were admitted to the 
United States in 2011. See Monger, supra note 1, at 1. Although 87% of these nonimmi-
grants were admitted temporarily for business and pleasure, 6.4% were admitted tempo-
rarily as workers and 3.4% were admitted temporarily as students. See id. 
5 See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that, in practice, fed-
eral law permits many aliens to maintain temporary worker authorization for a period 
exceeding six years); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(B)(15)(ii) (2012). 
6 See Michael Cornelius Kelly, Note, A Wavering Course: United States Supreme Court Treat-
ment of State Laws Regarding Aliens in the Twentieth Century, 25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 701, 701 
(2011); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1429 (1995) (noting several 
factors that combine to expose alien residents to governmental neglect or even hostility). 
7 See Kelly, supra note 6, at 702–04 (noting that the Court’s earliest decision on alien-
age legislation was in the 1886 case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins); see, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 
U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a New York statute restricting financial aid 
benefits for students attending higher education institutions); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 
721–22 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a Connecticut statute restricting non-resident 
aliens from taking the state bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (holding 
unconstitutional a New York statute imposing a citizenship requirement for state civil ser-
vice employment). 
8 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982) (noting that “[the] Court has 
many times considered state classifications dealing with aliens . . . [and] those cases ‘have not 
formed an unwavering line over the years’”). Specifically, the Supreme Court has shifted 
from giving deference to state laws targeting aliens to protecting aliens from state discrimina-
tion. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 703 (arguing that the competing goals of protecting traditional 
state power and protecting politically powerless alien minorities from discriminatory legisla-
tion have played a role in shaping the Court’s wavering jurisprudence); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 788 (4th ed. 2011) (stating 
that prior to 1971, the Court was extremely deferential to laws discriminating against aliens). 
But see Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise: An Argument for Greater Judicial 
Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 319, 323 (2001) (noting the current 
Court’s dwindling interest in protecting aliens from discrimination). 
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tion that aliens constitute “a discrete and insular minority” and there-
fore are entitled to rights as a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Consequently, the Court gen-
erally subjects state laws that target aliens to the highest level of judicial 
review: strict scrutiny.10 Using this level of review, the Court has consist-
ently struck down state laws that target aliens as unconstitutional viola-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause.11 
 The Court’s jurisprudence, however, is constrained to examining 
laws that deal with legal aliens generally, as opposed to nonimmigrant 
aliens specifically.12 As such, the Court has yet to rule explicitly that 
nonimmigrant aliens, in particular, are a “discrete and insular minority” 
entitled to suspect class status and the protection of strict scrutiny re-
view.13 The Court’s silence on this issue has led the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
                                                                                                                      
9 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Adam Bryan Wall, Comment, Justice for All?: The 
Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application to Legal Aliens, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 759, 766 
(2010). In the 1886 case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held for the first time that 
aliens are entitled to Equal Protection Clause rights. 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). Later, in 
the 1971 case, Graham v. Richardson, the Court classified aliens as a “prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” 
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
10 See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 790; see, e.g., Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 8–12; Sugarman, 
413 U.S. at 642–43. Strict scrutiny review, described by some scholars to be “strict by design 
and fatal in fact,” requires a showing that the law is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government purpose. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1973); see Wall, supra note 
9, at 762. As a result, strict scrutiny review almost always leads courts to strike down the 
challenged legislation. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 554; Wall, supra note 9, at 762. 
11 See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 790; see, e.g., Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 8–12; Sugarman, 
413 U.S. at 642–43. The Court, however, has chosen not to apply strict scrutiny in cases in 
which legislation targets undocumented aliens or restricts aliens from employment in po-
litical functions. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982) (striking down, under interme-
diate scrutiny, a Texas statute that withheld state education funds and authorized schools 
to deny entry to undocumented aliens); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (up-
holding, under rational basis review, a New York law excluding aliens from the police 
force). Rational basis review is the lowest level of judicial review. Chemerinsky, supra note 
8, at 552. Under the rational basis test, a law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose. Id. Intermediate scrutiny is the middle tier of judicial 
scrutiny. Id. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a law will be upheld if it is substantially 
related to an important government purpose. Id. 
12 See, e.g., Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74; LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 
2005). In many cases in which the Court has considered the constitutionality of a state law 
that discriminated against legal aliens, the law affected both nonimmigrant and LPR al-
iens. See, e.g., Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 2 (applying strict scrutiny to a law barring resident aliens 
from receiving financial aid); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 635 (applying strict scrutiny to a law 
limiting employment in a civil service position to citizens). Additionally, the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny review only in cases with LPR plaintiffs. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415. 
13 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74; LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415. 
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cuits to conclude that nonimmigrant aliens are not entitled to suspect 
class status and are entitled only to the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, 
rational basis review.14 In 2012, in Dandamudi v. Tisch, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit declined to follow the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits.15 Instead, the Second Circuit held that nonimmi-
grant aliens are a suspect class, and that laws targeting them therefore 
are subject to strict scrutiny review.16 
 Part I of this Comment first examines the New York law that led to 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Dandamudi and then discusses the fac-
tual and procedural history of the case.17 Part II examines the split be-
tween the Second Circuit and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits regarding the 
constitutional analysis of state laws targeting nonimmigrant aliens.18 
Finally, Part III argues that Dandamudi more faithfully comports with 
Supreme Court precedent than the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ decisions, 
advances the policy goals of the Equal Protection Clause, and fosters 
the ability of nonimmigrant aliens to contribute to the U.S. economy.19 
I. Dandamudi v. Tisch: An Equal Protection Challenge to New 
York’s Education Law 
 In 1982, New York State adjusted the citizenship provision for New 
York Education Law section 6805(1)(6), a statute that laid out the 
state’s requirements for obtaining a pharmacy license.20 The state legis-
lature changed the requirement that an applicant for a pharmacy li-
cense be a U.S. citizen—which disqualified all aliens—to a slightly less 
stringent requirement that an applicant be a citizen or LPR—thereby 
disqualifying only nonimmigrant aliens.21 A waiver provision in the law 
                                                                                                                      
14 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC), 500 F.3d 523, 533 
(6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419; Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 552. 
15 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74–75. 
16 See id. 
17 See infra notes 20–35 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 36–72 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. 
20 Brief for Appellant at 5–6, Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66 (No. 10-4397-cv); see N.Y. Educ. 
Law § 6805 (McKinney 2010). 
21 See N.Y. Educ. Law § 6805(1)(6); Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 5–6. New 
York changed its education law in June 1982 as a response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holdings in the Graham line of cases, which held that laws targeting LPR aliens are entitled 
to strict scrutiny review. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 
582, 597 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 
2012). The same month that New York changed its law, Justice William Rehnquist suggest-
ed in his dissent in Toll v. Moreno that laws that target nonimmigrant aliens should not be 
subject to heightened scrutiny. See 458 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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postponed the implementation of the citizenship/LPR requirement 
until 2006 and allowed nonimmigrant aliens to continue acquiring li-
censes until that time.22 When the citizenship/LPR requirement went 
into effect in 2006, many nonimmigrant aliens living in New York 
found their employment, and subsequently their visa statuses, in jeop-
ardy.23 Specifically, nonimmigrant aliens who had obtained licenses 
pursuant to the waiver provision could no longer renew their licenses 
and continue to work as licensed pharmacists.24 
 In 2009, in Adusumelli v. Steiner, twenty-six of these nonimmigrant 
pharmacists challenged the constitutionality of New York Education 
Law section 6805(1)(6) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.25 The district court ruled for the plaintiffs and struck 
down the law.26 New York appealed this decision to the Second Circuit 
in Dandamudi.27 
 In Dandamudi, the plaintiff pharmasists again argued that New 
York Education Law section 6805(1)(6) violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 They asserted that the law tar-
geted a suspect class—nonimmigrant aliens—and therefore warranted 
                                                                                                                      
22 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 71 n.5; Brief forAppellant, supra note 20, at 6–7. The New 
York Senate intended the statutory waiver to provide nonimmigrant aliens engaged in the 
process of changing their statuses to LPR with the opportunity to continue working as 
pharmacists. See S. 7405-B, 2005 Leg., 229th Sess. (N.Y. 2006). In justifying the waiver, the 
New York Senate also expressed concerns that there was a shortage of pharmacists in New 
York. See id. 
23 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 69 (calling New York Education Law section 6805 “a state 
regulatory scheme that seeks to prohibit some legally admitted aliens from doing the very 
thing the federal government indicated they could do when they came to the United 
States—work”). 
24 Adusumelli, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 586. 
25 Id. at 585–87. All but two of the plaintiffs had lived in the United States for more 
than six years. Id. at 586–87. Twenty-two plaintiffs had applied for green cards, thus ex-
pressing their intent to immigrate. Id. at 587. 
26 Id. at 587. The court applied “heightened scrutiny” to strike down the law, reasoning 
that the State failed to prove that its discriminatory means were substantially related to its 
governmental objectives. See id. at 598. Concluding that the law triggered a higher form of 
scrutiny than rational basis review, however, the court declined to articulate whether in-
termediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny applied. See id. Instead, the court stated that the 
choice between the two heightened levels of scrutiny was irrelevant because the law would 
not survive scrutiny under either standard. Id. 
27 686 F.3d at 70. 
28 Id. The plaintiffs also contended that the law was preempted by federal immigration 
law and violated nonimmigrants’ rights to interstate travel. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Alanna Farrell at 11, Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66 (No. 10-4397-cv) [hereinafter Farrell Brief]; 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, 12, 25, Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66 (No. 10-4397-cv). This 
Comment does not discuss these issues in depth. See infra notes 29–88 and accompanying 
text. 
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strict scrutiny review.29 The plaintiffs further contended that, under 
strict scrutiny, the court should strike down the law because it was not 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.30 Conversely, the 
State cited case law from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, and argued that 
nonimmigrant aliens are not a suspect class.31 Accordingly, the State 
urged the court to apply rational basis review and hold the law constitu-
tional because it was rationally related to a legitimate government pur-
pose.32 
 On July 10, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment and struck down New York Education Law section 
6805(1)(6).33 In its reasoning, the Second Circuit held that nonimmi-
grant aliens are a suspect class and that state legislation that unfairly 
targets nonimmigrant aliens is subject to strict scrutiny review.34 In do-
ing so, the Dandamudi court split significantly from the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits that apply rational basis review to laws targeting nonimmigrant 
aliens.35 
II. Splitting the Circuits: Classifying Nonimmigrant Aliens 
Under the Equal Protection Clause 
 The split between the circuits concerning how to treat legislation 
targeting nonimmigrant aliens arises from differing interpretations of 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.36 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits all acknowledge the bedrock of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for applying the Equal Protection 
Clause to aliens: “aliens constitute a discrete and insular minority” for 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Farrell Brief, supra note 28, at 13, 15, 27–30; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra 
note 28, at 33–34. 
30 See Farrell Brief, supra note 28, at 39–45. The plaintiffs also argued, in the alterna-
tive, that the law could have been struck down under the more deferential standard of 
rational basis review. See id. at 44. 
31 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 72; Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 15–16. 
32 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 30. The State argued that the law satisfied 
rational basis review because it protected the health, safety, and welfare of New York’s citi-
zens by eliminating the risk of nonimmigrant alien pharmacists fleeing the country when 
sued for malpractice. See id. at 31–33. 
33 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 79. 
34 See id. at 78–79. 
35 Compare id. at 74 (holding that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class, and that 
laws targeting them should be given strict scrutiny review), with LULAC, 500 F.3d at 533 
(holding that nonimmigrant aliens are not a suspect class, and that laws targeting them 
should be subject to rational basis review), and LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 420 (same). 
36 See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
2013] Suspect Class Protection for Nonimmigrant Aliens in Dandamudi v. Tisch 121 
whom strict scrutiny is appropriate.37 The circuits disagree, however, on 
the question of who exactly constitutes an “alien” under the Supreme 
Court’s standard.38 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits interpreted the Su-
preme Court’s statement as narrowly referring to only LPR aliens.39 The 
Second Circuit, by contrast, interpreted the Supreme Court’s statement 
to broadly apply to all legal aliens, both LPR and nonimmigrant.40 
 These two competing interpretations of precedent are crucial be-
cause they determine the scope of aliens’ suspect class protection.41 
Section A of this Part examines the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ narrow in-
terpretation.42 Then, Section B examines the Second Circuit’s broad 
interpretation.43 Both Sections address the reasoning underlying the 
circuits’ approaches, as well as the ramifications of their interpreta-
tions.44 
A. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ Approach: A Narrow Alien Suspect Class 
 In 2005, in LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit explained why a narrow 
interpretation of the Court’s suspect class status for aliens is appropri-
ate.45 The LeClerc court reasoned that the Supreme Court had two fac-
tors in mind when it deemed aliens “a discrete and insular minority”: 
(1) lack of political clout and (2) similarity to citizens.46 The Fifth Cir-
                                                                                                                      
37 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971); see Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2012); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC), 500 
F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2005). 
38 Compare Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77 (holding that legal aliens constitute a “discrete 
and insular” minority because of their impotence in the political process and the long 
history of discrimination against them), with LULAC, 500 F.3d at 533 (holding that only 
LPR aliens constitute a discrete and insular minority because of their similarity to citizens, 
but their inability to participate in the political process), and LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417–18 
(reasoning that the Court classified LPR aliens as “discrete and insular” because of (1) 
their inability to exert political power in their own interest despite their status as virtual 
citizens, and (2) the similarity of LPR aliens to citizens). 
39 See LULAC, 500 F.3d at 533; LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419. 
40 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77. 
41 See Wall, supra note 9, at 776–78. 
42 See infra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 61–72 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 45–72 and accompanying text. 
45 See 419 F.3d at 417. 
46 See id. The LeClerc court reasoned that the Supreme Court characterized aliens as a 
discrete and insular minority to reconcile the breadth of rights and responsibilities that 
aliens enjoy with their lack of political capacity. See id. To support its interpretation, the 
court relied on observations made by the Supreme Court in the 1973 case, In re Griffiths, 
concerning the similarities between resident aliens and citizens. See id. (citing In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)). In In re Griffiths, the Court applied strict scrutiny review to 
a state law restricting employment opportunities for aliens. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 
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cuit explained that because these factors are inherent to LPR aliens, 
but not to nonimmigrant aliens, only LPR aliens should be afforded 
suspect class status.47 
 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit determined that LPRs meet both fac-
tors of “a discrete and insular minority” because they are “virtual citi-
zens”; conversely, nonimmigrants do not because they are not “legally 
entrenched” in society.48 The court concluded that LPRs are “virtual 
citizens,” because despite having permanent status and a broad degree 
of rights and privileges like citizens, they lack the ability to vote.49 The 
court determined that LPRs’ characteristics as “virtual citizens” make 
them “a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’” warranting 
strict scrutiny protection.50 In contrast, the court concluded that 
nonimmigrant aliens are not “legally entrenched” enough in American 
society to be a discrete and insular minority.51 The court reasoned that 
nonimmigrant aliens have only a temporary connection to the United 
States and are generally not afforded as many privileges and rights as 
citizens or LPRs.52 Thus, the court held that nonimmigrants are not 
sufficiently similar to citizens to entitle them to suspect class status.53 
                                                                                                                      
722. The In re Griffiths Court observed that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, sup-
port the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our 
society,” and concluded that “[i]t is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it 
deprives them of employment opportunities.” Id. 
47 See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417. To bolster its rationale, the court noted that the Su-
preme Court has applied strict scrutiny only to cases concerning LPR plaintiffs. See id. at 
415, 419. 
48 Id. at 417. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (reasoning that this characterization of a discrete and insular minority “recon-
ciles the breadth of rights and responsibilities [LPRs] enjoy with their lack of political ca-
pacity”). 
51 Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that the numerous variations among nonimmi-
grant aliens’ admission statuses would make it inaccurate to describe nonimmigrant aliens 
as a single discrete and insular class. See id. 
52 See id. at 417–18. Specifically, the court noted that nonimmigrant aliens are admitted 
to the United States only for the duration of their visa, may not serve in the U.S. military, 
are subject to employment restrictions, incur differential tax treatment, may be denied 
federal welfare benefits, and must stipulate that they have no intention of abandoning 
their native citizenship. See id. 
53 See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 418–19. Furthermore, the LeClerc court expressed hesitancy to 
apply strict scrutiny analysis to a group to which the Supreme Court itself has never afford-
ed strict scrutiny. See id. The court noted that although the Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to apply strict scrutiny review to a law that targeted nonimmigrant aliens in Toll v. 
Moreno in 1982, it “shied away” from applying an Equal Protection Clause analysis. Id. at 
416, 419; see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16, 16–17 (1982). In Toll, the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional the University of Maryland’s policy of denying nonimmigrant 
students domiciled in Maryland the status of in-state students for purposes of tuition. See 
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Following this analysis, the LeClerc court applied rational basis review 
and upheld a Louisiana law that forbid nonimmigrant aliens from tak-
ing the state bar exam.54 
 In 2007, two years after the LeClerc decision, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in League of Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen 
(LULAC) adopted the LeClerc court’s interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent.55 In LULAC, the Sixth Circuit applied rational basis review 
and upheld a Tennessee law that forbid nonimmigrant aliens from 
gaining state-issued driver’s licenses.56 The LULAC court relied exten-
sively on the LeClerc court’s reasoning in its decision.57 As LULAC 
demonstrates, courts that follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding that 
nonimmigrant aliens are not a suspect class would apply rational basis 
review to analyze state laws targeting such individuals.58 Thus, those 
courts would uphold state laws that target nonimmigrant aliens as long 
as they are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.59 Be-
cause rational basis review is a comparatively easy standard to meet, its 
use would result in more state laws being upheld.60 
B. The Second Circuit’s Approach: Reaffirming a Broad Alien Suspect Class 
 In Dandamudi, the Second Circuit rejected the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
cuits’ narrow interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.61 The Second 
Circuit reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ view that similarity to 
citizenship is a requirement for suspect class status was based on an er-
roneous reading of precedent.62 In contrast to the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
                                                                                                                      
Toll, 458 U.S. at 17. The Court did so, however, because the policy was federally preempt-
ed; it did not address the policy’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause. See 
id. at 11–12 & nn.16–17. 
54 See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 421–22 (reasoning that Louisiana’s law barring nonimmi-
grants from becoming attorneys was rationally related to a public purpose because of an 
increased risk that nonimmigrant attorneys would leave the country to the detriment of 
their clients). 
55 See LULAC, 500 F.3d at 533. 
56 See id. at 536–37 (holding that Tennessee’s law denying driver’s licenses to nonim-
migrant aliens was rationally related to serving the state’s policy of not vouching for the 
identity of aliens not granted LPR status). 
57 See id. at 533. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 421; Kristin L. Beckman, Comment, Banned from the Bar: Classification of the 
Temporary Alien in Louisiana, 51 Loy. L. Rev. 139, 143 (2005) (noting that the rational basis 
test is “fairly easy to pass”). 
60 See Beckman, supra note 59, at 143. 
61 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 75–76. 
62 See id. at 75. The Second Circuit criticized the Fifth and Sixth Circuits for resting 
much of their analysis on the closing words of In re Griffiths, a case in which the Supreme 
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cuits, the Second Circuit in Dandamudi concluded that the Court should 
be taken “at its word” when it broadly characterized aliens as a discrete 
and insular minority.63 Supporting its broad interpretation, the Second 
Circuit reasoned that it was the common characteristics of all legal al-
iens—the lack of political clout and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and 
a long history of being victimized by invidious discrimination—that led 
the Court to extend all legal aliens suspect class status.64 Moreover, the 
Second Circuit stressed that nonimmigrant aliens’ status made them 
even more powerless and vulnerable to state predations than LPRs, thus 
making them even more of a discrete and insular minority.65 
 In addition to holding that nonimmigrant aliens should be treated 
as a suspect class by virtue of a broad interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent, the Dandamudi court further reasoned, in dicta, that 
nonimmigrant aliens would be entitled to suspect class status even un-
der the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ test.66 The court noted that nonimmi-
grants pay taxes, may indicate an intent to become LPRs, and some may 
remain in the United States to work professionally for a period exceed-
ing six years.67 Thus, under Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ test—which hinges 
on the premise that only aliens sufficiently similar to citizens be afford-
ed suspect class status—the court reasoned that nonimmigrants should 
be afforded suspect class status.68 
 Under its broad interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, the 
Dandamudi court applied strict scrutiny and struck down a New York 
law that forbid nonimmigrants from acquiring pharmacy licenses.69 
Courts following the Second Circuit’s holding that nonimmigrants are 
entitled to suspect class status would apply strict scrutiny to state laws 
targeting nonimmigrant aliens.70 Thus, courts using this interpretation 
will strike down state laws that target nonimmigrant aliens unless the 
state shows that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
                                                                                                                      
Court reasoned that the similarities between aliens and citizens supported aliens’ suspect 
class status. Id.; see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722. Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded 
that aliens’ similarities to citizens were not intended to be a litmus test for suspect class 
status. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 75. 
63 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78. 
64 See id. at 76. 
65 See id. at 77. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77. 
70 See id. at 76–77; Beckman, supra note 59, at 145. 
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purpose.71 Because this is a very difficult standard to prove, more laws 
would be struck down under the Second Circuit’s interpretation.72 
III. Dandamudi: An Affirmation of Nonimmigrant Aliens’ Rights 
 The Second Circuit’s approach in Dandamudi is preferable to the 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ approach for three reasons.73 First, the Dan-
damudi decision more faithfully comports with Supreme Court prece-
dent.74 Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Supreme Court has nev-
er held that nonimmigrant aliens should be outside suspect class 
status.75 In fact, the Court’s repeated affirmation that “aliens constitute 
a discrete and insular minority” that warrants suspect class status sug-
gests that nonimmigrant aliens, a subset of aliens, are entitled to sus-
pect class status.76 Thus, the Second Circuit’s placement of nonimmi-
grant aliens within the broader alien suspect class is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent.77 
 Second, the Second Circuit’s ruling stays faithful to the objectives 
of the Equal Protection Clause.78 The Equal Protection Clause prohib-
its any state from denying any person in its jurisdiction “the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”79 The Supreme Court has stated that this clause was 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 554; Beckman, supra note 59, at 145. 
72 See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 554; Beckman, supra note 59, at 145. 
73 See infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
74 See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2012); Wall, supra note 9, at 
774–76 (arguing that classifying nonimmigrants as a suspect class comports with Supreme 
Court precedent). 
75 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen 
(LULAC), 500 F.3d 523, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting); LeClerc v. Webb, 
419 F.3d 405, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2005). 
76 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78; Wall, supra note 9, at 775 (noting that the Court has 
made this general pronouncement despite its familiarity with distinction between LPR and 
nonimmigrant aliens); see also LULAC, 500 F.3d at 542–43 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (reason-
ing that the majority’s holding ignored the Supreme Court’s general rule that aliens con-
stitute a suspect class, thus creating a more specific rule for nonimmigrant aliens where no 
rule otherwise existed). 
77 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78–79. The Dandamudi court refused to create an excep-
tion to the Supreme Court’s general rule applying strict scrutiny review to state legislation 
targeting aliens. See id. Additionally, the Dandamudi court’s reasoning that suspect class 
status was extended by the Supreme Court to all legal aliens because of their political pow-
erlessness and the history of discrimination against them has found wide-ranging support 
among academics. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 791; Boyd, supra note 8, at 343; 
Wall, supra note 9, at 722. 
78 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77; Boyd, supra note 8, at 328, 339 (arguing that there is 
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters intended it to protect aliens and to 
eradicate anti-alien legislation); Wall, supra note 9, at 778. 
79 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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intended to achieve “nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based 
and invidious class-based legislation.”80 For years, the Court has classi-
fied aliens as a suspect class in order to abide by this principle and pro-
tect aliens against discriminatory state legislation.81 Therefore, by classi-
fying nonimmigrant aliens as a suspect class, the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Dandamudi affirms this principle of protecting society’s most 
vulnerable members.82 
 Third, the Dandamudi decision better allows nonimmigrants to con-
tribute to the U.S. economy.83 Removing nonimmigrant aliens from 
suspect class status, as the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have done, invites 
states to pass discriminatory employment restrictions that impede not 
only the ability of nonimmigrants to live in the United States, but also 
the ability of U.S. citizens to benefit from nonimmigrant services.84 
Nonimmigrant aliens contribute to the U.S. economy in a number of 
ways.85 Most prominently, they offer skilled labor to employers, skilled 
                                                                                                                      
80 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982); see Boyd, supra note 8, at 328. Senator Jacob 
Howard of Michigan, one of the Fourteenth Amendment’s sponsors, stated that the amend-
ment was designed to “abolish[] all class legislation in the States” by extending equal protec-
tion “not merely [to] a citizen of the United States, but [to] any person, whoever he may be” 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (emphasis added). 
81 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78–79; LULAC, 500 F.3d at 540–41 (Gilman, J., dissent-
ing); Wall, supra note 9, at 765; see, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Examining 
Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601–05 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
378 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to a discriminatory state statute and stating that “aliens 
lawfully within this country have a right to enter and abide in any State in the Union ‘on 
an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws’”(quoting 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948))). 
82 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77; Boyd, supra note 8, at 338, 339, 341–43 (noting that 
alienage is properly regarded as a suspect class because alienage legislation is frequently 
racially motivated, reflective of xenophobia, and perpetuated without the political input of 
aliens, who lack the power to vote); Wall, supra note 9, at 778. 
83 See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 69, 78; Storch, supra note 2, at 16 (noting the policy ben-
efits that the employment of nonimmigrants brings to the United States). 
84 See LULAC, 500 F.3d at 542 (Gilman, J., dissenting); LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting); Storch, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that restrictive state licensure laws deny 
opportunities to foreign workers who can benefit the U.S. workforce); Constitutional Law—
Equal Protection—Fifth Circuit Holds That Louisiana Can Prevent Nonimmigrant Aliens from Sit-
ting for the Bar—LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 676 
(2005) (arguing that upholding LeClerc’s restrictive interpretation could have far-reaching 
consequences); Wall, supra note 9, at 778 (arguing that excluding nonimmigrants from the 
protections of suspect class status could perpetuate new waves of social and political dis-
crimination). 
85 See Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research Serv., Report No. RL31381, U.S. Immi-
gration Policy on Temporary Admissions 1–3 (2011); Rachel Feltman, Undocumented 
Workers in the United States: Legal, Political, and Social Effects, 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 65, 
85 (2008); Anna C. Tavis, Note, Healthcare for All: Ensuring States Comply with the Equal Protec-
tion Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1627, 1630 (2010). 
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expertise to clients, and tax payments to the U.S. government.86 There-
fore, from a policy perspective, the Second Circuit’s affirmation that 
nonimmigrants are a suspect class inhibits states from discriminating 
against, and hindering, nonimmigrants’ ability to contribute to society.87 
For all of these reasons, other circuits should follow the Second Circuit’s 
lead and hold that nonimmigrant aliens constitute a suspect class.88 
Conclusion 
 In Dandamudi, the Second Circuit split with the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits by holding that nonimmigrant aliens constitute a discrete and 
insular minority deserving suspect class protection. The Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in Dandamudi more faithfully comports with Supreme 
Court precedent. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly 
on the status of nonimmigrant aliens, it has repeatedly declared that 
legal aliens warrant suspect class status because “aliens constitute a dis-
crete and insular minority” due to their political impotence and their 
long history of facing discrimination in the United States. Because 
nonimmigrant aliens are a subset of legal aliens that face these same 
obstacles, the Second Circuit’s decision in Dandamudi reaffirms Su-
preme Court precedent. Additionally, the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Dandamudi advances both the policy goals of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the economic goals of the nation by reigning in the power of 
states to discriminate against a susceptible class in American society. 
Consequently, other circuits should follow the Second Circuit’s lead in 
holding that nonimmigrant aliens constitute a suspect class. 
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86 See Feltman, supra note 85, at 85. 
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